Donaldson, Gromb and Piacentino (2019) suggest that, in the presence of limited commitment, increasing the fraction of a firm's cash flows that can be pledged as collateral might make the firm worse off. We show that, in fact, firms can never be hurt by increased pledgeability of cash flows in their framework. We then show that the first best can always be implemented by non-state contingent collateralized debt contracts that differ from the ones they consider.
(henceforth DGP) develop a dynamic model in which collateral (i) provides property rights that accrue to a secured creditor upon default, and (ii) gives an initial creditor the right of exclusion, preventing a subsequent creditor from seizing the collateral. DGP make the point that an initial creditor must rely on collateral to secure its claims when enough assets can be pledged as collateral. This is because if the initial creditor does not collateralize at least partially, it is too easy for a future borrower to fund new (possibly negative NPV) projects using collateralized credit that dilutes the claims of the initial creditor.
DGP identify what they term an inefficient collateral rat race that ensues when only a fraction of the firm's assets can be pledged as collateral. In this case, they argue that the demand for collateral from the initial creditors can be so high that it encumbers the assets, creating a collateral overhang that may inefficiently constrain future borrowing and investments. Their abstract highlights that: "Our results suggest that policies aimed at increasing the supply of collateral can backfire, triggering an inefficient collateral rat race." They also provide a motivating example in which they discuss two scenarios: a low-pledgeability case, in which the first best is implemented, and a high pledgeability case in which-supposedly-it is not. This suggests that, paradoxically, increasing the share of cash flows that a firm can pledge as collateral can make it worse off.
Our paper shows that, in fact, firms can never be hurt by having access to more pledgeable cash flows in DGP's setting. The result is intuitive, it extends beyond their two-state setting, and its validity does not require any of their parametric assumptions. To see the logic, consider the effect of a positive shock to a firm's pledgeable assets. Regardless of whether the firm was investing efficiently before, in the absence of informational asymmetries, having access to more collateral has an option value that cannot hurt. The firm can always fully offset the shock by issuing more secured debt at the outset, so as to keep the amount of collateral available for future investments constant, in which case the allocation implemented will be the same as before. Moreover, the firm might do better, if the availability of collateral previously constrained investment.
We complete our analysis by showing that alternative (non-state-contingent) collateral contracts can implement the first best for all parameter values. Our findings suggest that future investigations of the conditions under which pledgeability might hurt a firm should explicitly consider informational asymmetries between the firm and its investors.
In an extension, DGP relax the equivalence between pledgeable and collateralizable assets assumed in their core model. Specifically, Section 4.7 assumes that a fraction of pledgeable assets cannot be used as collateral. DGP then argue that high collateralizability may be associated with underinvestment. In Appendix 1 we show that this requires the cash flows of negative NPV projects to be more collateralizable than those of positive NPV ones. If the fraction of cash flows that is collateralizable is project-independent-as is assumed to hold for pledgeability-then increased collateralizability can only help a firm.
The motivating example. To provide intuition, DGP first give an example in which a firm requires external debt finance to pursue investment projects at dates 0 and 1, where the date 0 project has a positive NPV, but the date 1 project has a negative NPV. They show that when the fraction θ of cash flows that can be pledged is low then unsecured debt can be used to finance the positive NPV date 0 project, as it does not leave enough pledgeable assets to fund the negative NPV date 1 project.
In this example, the positive NPV date 0 project costs 200, and pays 600 at date 2. The negative NPV date 1 project costs 500, and pays 400 at date 2. When pledgeability is low (e.g., θ = 2 5 ) the date 0 project can be funded with unsecured debt without being concerned that the date 1 project will be undertaken, because there is not enough total pledgeable cash flow to cover its cost: 2 5 (600+400) = 400 < 500. When pledgeability rises to θ = 1 2 , the date 0 project must be financed using some secured debt, as now the total pledgeable cash flow covers the cost of the date 1 project: 1 2 (600+400) = 500. As a result, a date-1 creditor C 1 would be willing to lend if the date 0 project were funded with unsecured debt. However, DGP observe that if at date 0 the firm issued fully secured debti.e., debt fully backed by collateral-then at date 1 the inefficient investment is prevented. Because the date 0 debt is riskless, competition in the credit market pushes its face value to 200. Thus, debt can be backed by σ = 2 3 of project 0's pledgeable cash flow, as 2 3 1 2 600 = 200. Once the date-0 creditor C 0 has priority, a date-1 creditor C 1 is unwilling to lend. DGP then ask, "But what if project 1 were unexpectedly good, with payoff 550?" This payoff exceeds its 500 cost-can it be financed? The answer is that, when θ = 1 2 and σ = 2 3 , there is not enough pledgeable cash flow net the repayment to a date-1 creditor to cover its cost: 1 2 (600 + 550) − 200 = 375 < 500. By fully collateralizing project 0, the borrower cannot pledge enough to finance its positive NPV project at date 1. That is, the collateral overhang results in an inefficient outcome. As DGP put it: "By collateralizing its debt to C 0 , [the Borrower] B has encumbered its assets and cannot pledge enough to C 1 to finance a positive NPV project. There is a collateral overhang."
This presentation suggests that inefficient investment might be an equilibrium outcome. In fact, it is not. Full collateralization of σ = 2 3 of the pledgeable cash flows from project 0 is not needed to discourage a date 1 lender from funding the negative NPV project. Indeed, securing any fraction σ ∈ (0, 1 4 ] achieves the optimum: (i) it prevents investment if the date 1 project has a negative NPV, because 1 2 ((1 − σ )600 + 400) < 500; and (ii) it enables investment if the date 1 project has a positive NPV, because 1 2 ((1 − σ )600 + 550) ≥ 500. As a result, the collateral rat race has no effect on efficiency in this example; in equilibrium, a higher rate of pledgeability θ does not make the firm worse off.
This result reflects that the conditions for an inefficient outcome (see DGP's Corollary 2 ) are not satisfied in the example. 1 So, in this example a paradox in which increasing pledgeability hurts a firm does not arise. Our paper shows that it never does.
Setup. There are three dates (t = 0, 1, 2) and one consumption good dubbed cash. A borrower B has no cash but has access to two investment projects: one at t = 0 and one at t = 1. The date 0 project requires investment I 0 > 0 at t = 0 to generate X 0 for sure at t = 2. At date 1, a state s ∈ {H, L} realizes, where p := Pr[s = H] is the probability of a high state. In state s, B can invest in a project that requires borrowing I s 1 and delivers X s 1 for sure at date 2. The state L project has a negative NPV and is inefficient to fund, while the state H project has a positive NPV and is efficient to fund. B can raise financing from a competitive credit market at each date. In particular, B can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a set of competitive financiers at dates t = 0, 1. There is no discounting, all agents are risk neutral, they consume only at date 2 and there are no informational asymmetries at any date. The final cash flow is X :
Here, i 0 = 0 means that there is no investment at date 0, and i s 1 = 0 means that there is no investment at date 1 in state s. There are two frictions. First, a fraction 1 − θ of the final cash flow X is not pledgeable. That is, B can always divert this fraction of the final project payoffs. Second, at date 0, B cannot credibly constrain its future investment and financing actions-a form of limited commitment that DGP term 'non-exclusivity'.
In addition, DGP exogenously constrain the set of admissible contracts. Specifically, DGP assume that if a security is backed by a fraction σ of the pledgeable cash flow θX, so that the value of the collateral is σθX, then that fraction σ cannot depend on the state of the world s, even though this state is observable and verifiable by all parties ex post. When σ = 1, all pledgeable cash flows θX are used as collateral.
Assumptions. DGP impose five restrictions on model parameters: A1. Project 0's pledgeable payoff in state L alone exceeds its investment cost: I 0 <
(1 − p)θX 0 , which implies that I 0 < X 0 . Thus, a creditor is willing to lend at date 0 if she anticipates no dilution in state L.
A2. Project 1's NPV is positive in state H but not in state L:
A3. The pledgeable cash flow fails to cover the investment needed at date 1 in all states:
Thus, B may be unable to fund Project 1 in state H.
Thus, B has an incentive to undertake Project 1 even in the negative NPV state L.
A5. Project 1's cost is not too high:
That is, there is enough pledgeable total cash to fund Project 1 in the positive NPV state H.
DGP then observe that for a collateral rat race to result in a collateral overhang-that is, an inefficient outcome-two further conditions need to be met:
A6. The pledgeable cash flows are high enough to fund Project 1 in the negative NPV state L: θ ≥ θ * :=
Thus, a date-0 creditor is not willing to lend unsecured.
A7. Project 1's cost in state H is large enough:
. Thus, the date 0 collateralization demand makes financing Project 1 in state H impossible.
Two preliminary results. A2 asserts that the project has positive a NPV in state H, but a negative NPV in state L, making the problem interesting. Lemma 1 shows that if A2 holds, then A7 can be satisfied by some θ only if X H 1 > X L 1 , which we henceforth assume.
Lemma 1. If X H 1 ≤ X L 1 , then A7 and A2 do not simultaneously hold for any θ ∈ [0, 1].
The condition can be satisfied by
By Lemma 1, A7 can be rewritten as an upper bound on pledgeability θ required for a collateral overhang (i.e., an inefficient outcome) to arise:
We next show that Assumptions A1, A3, A4, and A5 can be rewritten as representing an upper and a lower bound on the set of feasible pledgeability levels θ:
Lemma 2. Conditions A1, A3, A4 and A5 can be rewritten compactly as θ ∈ (θ,θ), where
(1)
Proof. From A2, X L 1 < I L 1 , so A4 implies that A3 never binds in state s = L. We then rewrite A1 as θ > I 0
(1−p)X 0 , A3 as θ <
That θ > 0 andθ < 1 follows immediately from A1-A5.
Equilibrium allocation and implementation. DGP summarize the equilibrium outcomes and their implementation using secured and unsecured debt in Corollary 2 :
Corollary 2 (DGP). The equilibrium outcome is as follows. The third case, where a collateral overhang arises, provides the foundation of DGP's contribution, as detailed in their abstract: "Creditors thus require collateral for protection against possible dilution by collateralized debt. There is a collateral rat race. But collateralized borrowing has a cost: it encumbers assets constraining future borrowing and investment. There is a collateral overhang. Our results suggest that policies aimed at increasing the supply of collateral can backfire, triggering an inefficient collateral rat race."
While such statements throughout the paper emphasize the inefficiency of increasing pledgeability, DGP's Proposition 1 proposes a weaker notion of a paradox: "If θ < θ * , C 0 [the date-0 creditor] lends unsecured and the first best is attained; [...] if θ ≥ θ * C 0 does not lend unsecured." There are two important points to make about this result. First, when θ ≥ θ * , secured lending may well implement the first best; when this is so, higher pledgeability of cash flows does not hurt the firm and is irrelevant. Second, when θ < θ * , creditors do not need to lend unsecured: a continuum of partially-secured loans can implement the same equilibrium outcome-i.e., the first best. To highlight this point, we show that regardless of the degree of pledgeability θ, the same partially unsecured debt contract can implement the first best-whenever it can be attained. Adopting this alternative implementation, we rewrite Corollary 2 in terms ofθ =
rather than θ * and I * 1 :
Corollary 2 (content restated). The equilibrium outcome is as follows.
If θ ≤θ, then the date-0 creditor C 0 lends fully secured and there is no investment at date 1, regardless of whether the state is high or low.
If θ >θ, then C 0 lends partially secured, with collateral σ set such that 
it is clear that A6 always holds. As a result, the case where θ ≥ θ * and I H 1 ≥ I * 1 corresponds to θ ≤θ. Next, note that a partially-secured debt contract with collateral σ set to equate θ(1 − σ)X 0 = I H 1 − θX H 1 always implements the first best, when θ <θ. This contract enables the financing of the good project, as the good project requires exactly θ(1 − σ)X 0 , which is the remaining collateral from the date 0 project. Moreover, the contract prevents the financing of the bad project at date 1, as the bad project requires I L 1 − θX L 1 > I H 1 − θX H 1 = θ(1 − σ)X 0 , where the first inequality follows from the fact that I L 1 − θX L 1 > I H 1 − θX H 1 ⇐⇒ θ >θ. It follows from A1 that a date 0 lender breaks even under such a contract, establishing the equivalence argument. This restatement of Corollary 2 based on Lemma 1 and A7 clarifies that borrowers never realize a gain from being able to lend unsecured in DGP's framework.
For a paradox to arise in which increased pledgeability of cash flows results in an inefficient collateral rat race, there must be a firm for which there is a low θ < θ * at which the first best is implemented, while at a higher θ ≥ θ * it is not. Theorem 1 establishes that, in DGP's framework, this is impossible: greater pledgeability can only improve real investment efficiency, thereby helping borrowing firms.
Theorem 1. There is no 'paradox': firm value weakly increases with pledgeability θ.
1. If θ * ≥θ, then the first best is implemented for every θ; 2. If θ * ∈ (θ,θ), then θ >θ for all θ ∈ (θ,θ), so the first best always obtains; 3. If θ * ≤ θ, then there are three sub-cases:
(a) Ifθ ≤ θ, then the first best is implemented for every θ;
(b) Ifθ ≥θ, then the first best is never implemented for any θ;
(c) Ifθ ∈ (θ,θ), the first best is not implemented for θ ≤θ, while it is for θ >θ.
Proof. Case 1. Follows from Corollary 2 (DGP): if θ * ≥θ, then A6 is violated for all θ.
Case 2. Rewrite A7 as: (θ,θ) , there must exist some degree of pledgeability θ ∈ (θ, θ * ). From A6, θ < θ * if and only if θ < Case 3c. Follows from the fact that whenθ is interior and θ * ≤ θ, then A6 and A7 jointly hold for a low θ ≤θ (in which case we do not get first-best), while A7 is violated for every θ >θ (in which case we get first-best).
Theorem 1 shows that one cannot make a firm better off by reducing the pledgeability θ of its cash flows. The key condition used in the proof is A5, which states that there is enough pledgeable cash in the high state at date 1 to invest in the positive NPV project if date-0 creditors lend unsecured. The proof establishes that if the threshold θ * satisfies conditions A1-A5 (i.e., if θ * ∈ (θ,θ)), then it is not possible for A7 to hold. Thus, θ * ∈ (θ,θ) is incompatible with the final case in Corollary 2, where greater pledgeability can possibly hurt a firm. Relaxing A5 would not change the result. If θ is so low that A5 does not hold, then it would be impossible to finance the positive NPV project regardless of the date 0 contract, rendering the problem uninteresting. Moreover, increasing pledgeability to a level that satisfies A5 could only make the firm better off.
Graphical argument and generalization. We now show that Theorem 1 is driven by the fundamental economic forces of the model, and that it extends beyond DGP's setting. To this end, we present a graphical proof of Theorem 1, which uses the representation of the problem in Figure 1 . Define the collateral-gap in state s to be: CG s := I s 1 − θX s 1 , for s ∈ {L, H}. This quantity describes the shortfall of collateral in state s at date 1. We rewrite A3 as CG s > θX 0 − I 0 , ∀s, while A5 reads CG H < θX 0 . As our proof to the alternative statement of Corollary 2 shows, inefficiencies can arise only if I H 1 ≥ I * 1 , which we write as CG L ≤ CG H . In such a case, A6 always holds as θ ≥ θ * ⇐⇒ CG L ≤ θX 0 . Figure 1 . For a collateral overhang to arise for some θ ∈ [0, 1], by Lemma 1 it must be that X H 1 > X L 1 . It follows that
That is, as pledgeability θ rises, CG H shifts to the left (i.e., it falls) faster than CG L . Recall from DGP's characterization that whenever CG L ∈ {b, c}, we are at first-best. If CG L ∈ a, there is an inefficient collateral overhangno date-1 project is funded, regardless of its NPV. Because ∂CG H ∂θ < ∂CG L ∂θ , if we start from CG L ∈ a and increase θ to transition to a different region, then the transition must be to CG L ∈ b. In this case, we now implement the first best for such a θ. Moreover, CG L ∈ b is an absorbing state: once we enter it for some θ, we stay there for every larger θ. Thus, if CG L ∈ a, then efficiency can only increase as θ rises.
This graphical argument suggests that the beneficial role played by greater pledgeability of cash flows should extend beyond DGP's setting. To show this, we relax the structure of assumptions A1-A5, and allow for an arbitrary number of date-1 projects.
We now consider any finite number of date-1 states, indexed by s ∈ 1, 2, ..., N and characterized by I s 1 and X s 1 . Without loss of generality, order states by NPV so that if X s 1 −I s 1 > X s 1 −I s 1 then s > s . To start, we prove a slight generalization of our Lemma 1: We now generalize Theorem 1 to show that pledgeability can never hurt a firm in any N −state setting, regardless of whether assumptions A1-A5 hold or not.
Theorem 2. In our N −state setting, firm value weakly increases with pledgeability θ.
Proof. For greater pledgeability of cash flows to reduce the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation, there must exist at least one pair of states s > s and pledgeability levels θ > θ such that: (1) CG s (θ) > CG s (θ), and (2) CG s (θ ) < CG s (θ ). From Lemma 3, for (2) Investment at date 1 as an 'excuse to dilute'. In DGP's setting, the possibility of dilution is tightly linked to investment at date 1. In particular, a borrower is not allowed to dilute date-0 creditors unless it invests in a new project. 2 One may wonder whether this assumption is critical in sustaining the beneficial role played by pledgeability. To see that it is not needed, first note that if a borrower can freely dilute the date-0 creditors, then lending at date 0 requires full collateralization. Thus, at date 1, the borrower has access to collateral of θX 0 − I 0 . By A3, I s 1 − θX s 1 > θX 0 − I 0 > 0, so there is never enough collateral left to finance a project at date one. Beyond A3, the borrower never has an incentive to finance negative NPV projects when he is free to dilute, as the option of diluting without 'burning cash' is always more desirable. Moreover, increasing θ so that A3 ceases to hold makes the borrower better off, enabling the financing of positive NPV projects.
Optimal non-state-contingent contracts. Thus far, we have restricted attention to the family of debt contracts considered by DGP. However, DGP note that state-contingent collateralization-i.e., making the fraction of secured output σ a function of the state scan always implement the first best: "We have assumed away state-contingent collateralization. Were it possible, it could circumvent the inefficiencies arising in our analysis."
We conclude by establishing that state-contingent collateral is not needed to implement the first best. Lemma 1 showed that inefficiencies arise only when X H 1 > X L 1 and I H 1 > I L 1 . This strict difference in investment levels across states, which is needed to generate inefficiencies, gives the borrower a simple, non-state-contingent instrument to implement the first best. Proposition 1 shows that reducing collateral demands when the firm's rate of investment is sufficiently high at date 1 always implements the first best.
Proposition 1. Under A1-A7, the first best can be implemented by borrowing (partially) secured at date 0, with a collateral discount if B invests more thanÎ ∈ [I L 1 , I H 1 ) at date 1. For instance, B can issue debt with face value D 0 and collateral rate σ 0 (I 1 ) at date 0, where σ 0 (I 1 ) = 1 if I 1 ≤Î, σ 0 (I 1 ) = 0 if I 1 >Î, forÎ ∈ [I L 1 , I H 1 ).
Proof. See Appendix 2.
2 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Pledgeability vs. Collateralizability
In Section 3.2, DGP use the term 'collateralizability' to describe a property of all pledgeable cash flows, as is standard in the literature. Specifically, creditors can secure as collateral any fraction σ ∈ [0, 1] of the pledgeable cash flows θX. Later, in Section 4.7, DGP introduce a distinction between 'pledgeable' and 'collateralizable' assets, arguing that some pledgeable assets might not be usable as collateral. They redefine collateralizable assets as a fraction µ ∈ [0, 1] of the pledgeable cash flows θX that can be used as collateral-i.e., only for these assets can property rights be assigned to an individual creditor. In contrast to pledgeable cash flows, which are a given fraction θ of the firm's cash flows, collateralizable assets are introduced with a time-specific index µ t .
In their Proposition 4, DGP assume that p is small 'enough' and state that 'If µ 1 > µ * 1 , B does not invest at Date 0 or Date 1', where the threshold µ * 1 solves
(1 + µ * 1 )θX L 1 + (1 − µ 0 )θX 0 = 2I L 1 .
(2)
The result suggests that high collateralizability may hurt a firm. One might wonder whether Proposition 4 delivers an alternative 'paradox of collateralizability'. We now clarify that this is not so. To illustrate, suppose that, like pledgeability θ, the fraction of collateralizable assets is independent of the specific project, so that µ t = µ for all t. If X L 1 > X 0 , then using equation (2), the condition µ > µ * 1 can be written as µ ≥ 2I L 1 −θ(X 0 +X L 1 ) θ(X L 1 −X 0 ) . There exists some µ such that µ > µ * 1 only if
< 1, or, equivalently, if θX L 1 > I L 1 . However, this violates A2, which requires the bad project to have a negative NPV. Similarly, if X L 1 = X 0 , re-arranging the condition again yields that µ > µ * 1 if and only if 0 > I L 1 − θX L 1 , violating A2. The remaining case of X L 1 < X 0 is more interesting. The condition µ > µ * 1 can be written as: µ < θ(X 0 +X L 1 )−2I L 1 θ(X 0 −X L 1 ) , revealing that when µ 1 = µ 0 , contrary to what a 'paradox of collateralizability' would require, the inefficient date-0 under-investment detailed in Proposition 4 arises only when collateralizability is sufficiently low. To see the intuition, consider equation (11) in DGP with σ 0 = µ 0 = µ 1 = µ: (1 + µ)θX L 1 + (1 − µ)θX 0 ≥ 2I L 1 . This equation details the conditions under which B would borrow at date 1 with a bad project. When µ increases, the right-hand side does not change. However, the derivative of the left-hand side with respect to µ is θ(X L 1 − X 0 ) < 0. Thus, increasing µ makes this condition harder to satisfy. As a result, when collateralizability is not project-specific, there is no paradox, and increasing µ is beneficial. 3 Proposition 4 effectively says that a disproportionally higher collateralizability of the negative NPV date-1 project, relative to the positive NPV date-0 project, can encumber a firm's assets. This unsurprising result extends immediately to Corollary 3, where DGP take the analogous derivative with respect to µ 1 , leaving µ 0 fixed.
